And even Jelena's cynicism at the Knez restaurant yesterday was slightly misplaced. According to the text of the Kosovo peace agreement available in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic has succeeded in erasing a key element of the Paris peace agreement: a referendum on the future of the province in three years' time that might have allowed Kosovo Albanians to demand independence. And one of Mr Milosevic's ministers was quick to seize on another apparent departure from the March accord: the disappearance of an annex to the Paris agreement, which would have allowed Nato troops free access to all of Yugoslavia. Nato, it appears, will have to move in out of Kosovo only through the narrow roads of Macedonia and Albania.And a close scrutiny of the text suggests that if Serbia has been humiliated - its army and police in Kosovo reduced to a mere skeleton, the province controlled by an army of foreigners - Belgrade's guerrilla enemies in the KLA will face emasculation."Demilitarised" by Nato, the KLA's declared intention of achieving independence will be opposed by its Western protectors. And if Serbia's MPs are to be believed, Yugoslavia's frontiers are now regarded as "inviolable" by the Nato powers So much for Kosovo's independence. Will the KLA accept this - or will it turn against Nato?In Belgrade, this all seems academic.

The papers here have been advising readers how to keep warm this coming winter in a Serbia that will have no infrastructure and few functioning power stations. Burn trees from the forests and old floorboards, they are told, store water in a land whose water pumping stations have stopped working. They've even asked the tram and trolley-bus crews to reduce their schedules to save electricity.But war invisibly wounds the living, too Take the lady who cleans my hotel room each morning. Both her sons are at the front in Kosovo and she has been weeping every day in fear for their safety Now she need weep no more But last weekend, one of them came home on two days' leave "He had changed," she said "I don't know what had happened to him But he was no longer like my son I cry now because he is a different boy.". THE DEAL struck yesterday between the two peace envoys and Slobodan Milosevic deals a huge blow to Serbia, but as the analysis of the text shows, it also provides room for manoeuvre and parts of it will allow the Yugoslav president to proclaim a victory of sorts to his people. 1 An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. Despite this, Mr Milosevic's generals may yet ignore orders from Belgrade to stop attacking the Albanians at the very point at which they have driven most of them out of the province.

Mr Milosevic will be watching keenly for signs of a revolt and will doubtless fire many of them in the coming weeks.2 The verifiable withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo according to a speedy time schedule.This is a disaster for Belgrade. In a province where 90 per cent of the 1.8 million population is hostile, Serbia can only keep a grip through a massive security presence. Serbia will try to haggle over the meaning of "speedy" and will try to convert some of its security forces overnight into members of the local civilian administration. After all, they will still control the local councils until a new UN government for Kosovo is appointed.3 The stationing in Kosovo, under a UN mandate, of effective international, civilian and military presences that could act in line with a possible decision according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.Another heavy blow to Belgrade, though Mr Milosevic will try to conceal it by saying it is better to have a UN mandate over Kosovo - Yugoslavia is a founder member - than Nato on its own. The UN involvement will also bring the Russians on board and possibly some other friendly states.4 An international security presence, with fundamental participation by Nato, must be placed under unified command and control and authorised to maintain safe surroundings for the population in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return of displaced individuals and refugees to their homes.This was the key point for Nato in its talks with Russia which argued for a separate Russian military presence.

The presence in Kosovo of Nato troops, which Belgrade vowed never to accept, is especially humiliating for Serbia Kosovo may end up with Russian-controlled zones. But Nato appears to have seen off the threat of the "soft-partition" of Kosovo into "eastern" and "western" blocs.5 The establishment of a provisional administration for Kosovo as part of the international civilian presence that would be decided upon by the UN Security Council under which the people of Kosovo would enjoy meaningful autonomy within the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).Mr Milosevic came to power in 1987 on a pledge to scrap Kosovo's autonomy, which he then did in 1989. Now he has to stand back and watch Kosovo receive much greater powers of home rule than it ever dreamt of enjoying in the old Yugoslavia. Mr Milosevic will pass over this point, however, and stress the fact that autonomy is better than independence and that Yugoslavia and Serbia's internationally recognised frontiers are not going to be altered.6 After the withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be allowed to return in order to fulfil the following duties: contact with the international civilian mission and international security presence; mark mine fields and participate in clearance; maintain presence at places of Serb national heritage; maintain presence at key border crossing points.This is the carrot for Serbia and the worst part of the deal for the Kosovo Albanian refugees. The last thing they want to see is Serbian officials when they go home. Mr Milosevic is doubtless scanning the map of Kosovo marking out as many places as possible as sites of Serbian heritage, where his personnel can be stationed.